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Copyright, Fair Use and Photocopying:
A Stone Conundrum*
"Copyright admits of philosophic thinking more than most other parts
of the law."' While it is universally recognized that copyright is open
to the objection that it burdens both competitiors and the public, the
monopoly is permitted and encouraged by the law for the public advan-
tage it serves. By protecting the property rights of the author in his
work, copyright attempts to assure that the public may enjoy the bene-
fits of a continuing supply of creative works. Constant attention must
be paid and adjustments made to the copyright law to assure that the
burdens of such protection do not outweigh the benefits. The broad and
as yet inadequately defined "fair use" doctrine2 has increasingly been
relied upon when considering the proper scope of the monopoly in any
particular case. Due to the pervasiveness of philosophical uncertainties,
the fair use doctrine has proven a difficult and ponderous area of copy-
right law. It has on occasion been confused with issues of initial infringe-
ment and damages.
I suggest that the fair use doctrine might better be understood after
analysis of several related and more fundamental issues. Does the Con-
stitution mandate a fair use doctrine, or, may fair use more helpfully
be characterized as a defense which would arise after an initial determi-
nation of infringement? If a defense, some cases may turn on more
palatable issues such as when a work is deemed "copied" or when works
in question are "substantially similar." This article shall also explore the
impact of reprography3 on the quantity and quality of information
* This article, in somewhat different form, has been entered in the 24th annual
Nathan Burkan Memorial Writing Competition.
I. Chafee, Reflections on the Law of Copyright: I (pt. 1), 45 COLUM. L. REV.
503 (1945).
2. The most widely accepted definition is that "fair use" is a "privilege in others
than the owner of a copyright to use the copyrighted material in a reasonable manner
without his consent, notwithstanding the monopoly granted to the owner. . . ." BALL,
COPYRIGHT AND LITERARY PROPERTY 260 (1944). The fair use doctrine now appears at
§107 of the Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976)(to be
codified as 17 U.S.C. §§101-810) [hereinafter cited as New Act]. This Act became
effective on January 1, 1978.
3. "The reproduction of graphic material especially by electronic means."
1
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available. Further, thoughts and perspectives are offered on the relation-
ship of educational and library photocopying to fair use. Lastly, sections
107 and 108 of the new Copyright Act' are examined in light of the
legislative history5 as they relate to photocopying.
1. FAIR USE: QUESTIONS AND PERSPECTIVES
"The Congress shall have Power. . . To promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discover-
ies."' It has been said that the constitutional statement of purpose was
intended by the framers as a preamble to the grant of congressional
power and not as a limitation of its exercise.7 This view is supported by
the fact that the power of Congress to grant copyright has not been
confined to those works which actually and undeniably promote the
progress of science and the useful arts.' This broad power of Congress
to grant copyright does not, however, necessarily aid in defining the
scope of power granted in any particular case. For, if the statement of
purpose is construed as a limitation on the exclusivity of the rights
granted by Congress, is this not a constitutional mandate for the fair
use doctrine?
This issue encompasses any discussion of the two basic directives
within the Copyright Clause: that the rights granted be for "limited
times"' and that the rights of the author be "exclusive." The Constitu-
BARNHART DICTIONARY OF NEW ENGLISH SINCE 1963 at 402 (1st ed. 1973).
4. New Act, supra note 2.
5. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 47 [hereinafter cited as HOUSE
REPORT] reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5659; S. REP. No. 473,
94th Cong. 1st Sess. 47 (1975) [hereinafter cited as SENATE REPORT1, Conf. Rep.
H.R. REP. No. 1733, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 65 [hereinafter cited as CONFERENCE
REPORT], reprinted in [19761 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5810.
6. U.S. CONST. art. I, §8, cl. 8.
7. 1 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.03 [A], at 1-30 (1978).
8. See Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239 (1903), where the
Court per Holmes, J. found a circus poster a suitable subject for copyright, and there-
fore within the constitutional statement of purpose. The arguable utility of this litho-
graph poster in the promotion of the useful arts is evidenced by the dissenting opinion
per Harlan, J.: "A mere advertisement. . . would not be promotive of the useful arts,
within the meaning of the constitutional provision . . . ." Id. at 252.
9. The following discussion of "exclusivity" may be applied by analogy to this
constitutional limitation on the duration of the copyright, a specific discussion of which
is not within the scope of this writing. See New Act, supra note 2, at §§302-05.
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tion, be it for better or worse, does not provide guidance as to the
balancing which must inevitably and constantly be performed in deter-
mining that degree of "exclusivity" which will best promote the progress
of science and useful arts. It may be this "balancing" which is both the
initial and ultimate dilemma in copyright law, that which has caused
copyright to be called the ultimate jurisprudential area of the law."
Although it has been argued that there exists a constitutional mandate
that any copyright provided by Congress be exclusive," the survival of
compulsory licensing, statutory recognition of fair use and limitations
on the right found generally at 17 U.S.C. §§107-18 are evidence of the
current reality that a copyright, at least in the final analysis, is some-
thing less than an exclusive right. 12
Regardless of a court's final determination of the degree of exclu-
sivity of the right in any particular case, it would seem helpful to a
logical consideration of all of the issues to isolate as much as possible
issues of constitutional limitations on the right. Such isolation of the
issues could prove especially helpful where questions of "fair use" arise.
The scope and limits of the doctrine have evaded definition for so long
that the entire fair use issue is widely recognized as "the most trouble-
some in the whole law of copyright."' 3 Judicial considerations of the
fairness of the complained of use should be confined to situations in
which it is properly raised as a defense:" that is, after plaintiff's state-
10. Complete vindication of the creator's economic interest would logically re-
quire that the statutory monopoly be absolute. Likewise, the logic of full vindica-
tion of the immediate public interest in free access would require that no statutory
monopoly at all be permitted. The copyright statute reflects a reasoned compro-
mise between these competing interests.
Goldstein, Copyright and the First Amendment, 70 COLUM. L. REv. 983, 1006 (1970)
(emphasis added). See generally Chafee, supra note 1.
!1. See testimony of Nathan Burkan, Esq. before a congressional committee,
Hearings on S. 2328 and H.R. 10353, 69th Cong., Ist Sess. 31-32 (1926); WEIL, AMERI-
CAN COPYRIGHT LAW 62-63 (1917): "[I]f it [Congress] determines to legislate, it may
[not] give more, or less, than the only thing it is empowered to give, viz: an exclusive
right."
12. See, e.g., Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 529-30
(1972) wherein the Court upheld the rule enunciated in the leading case of Radio Corp.
of America v. Andrea, 79 F.2d 626 (2d Cir. 1935) (restricting rights of patentees in
combination patents) despite plaintiff's argument that the Constitutional mandate of
Article I, section 8 was not properly reflected in the prevailing law.
13. Dellar v. Samual Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F.2d 661, 662 (2d Cir. 1939); 3 M.
NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §13.05, at 13-48 (1978).
14. Dellar v. Samual Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F.2d 661, 662 (2d Cir. 1939). In finding
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ment of his prima facie case. This would seem an appropriate and
prudent time for the courts to practice some judicial parsimony, thereby
forcing, if at all possible, a reduction of the fair use issue to its most
fundamental elements. Assuming the work in question is both copy-
rightable and properly copyrighted, the fair use issue may disentangle
into less complex although similarly difficult issues. Opponents of such
limited application of the fair use doctrine may be found eager to point
out that first amendment considerations would take precedence over the
statutory copyright privilege, and that an appeal of a constitutionally
based fair use defense should prove successful as a first amendment non-
infringing use. Supreme Court consideration and discussion of this ripe
and thorny issue could only prove helpful.
Perhaps there may never be a final resolution of the seeming con-
flict between Article I, section 8 and the freedom of speech and press
provided by the first amendment, but an airing of the countervailing
considerations is becoming overdue.15 The advocates of greater public
access and a constitutionally grounded fair use doctrine would be quick
to remind the court that precedent exists for such a belated finding of
constitutional mandate. 6 Defenders of the exclusive monopoly of the
copyright holder would no doubt argue that the policy of public access
is best served in the long run not by narrowing the scope of copyright
but by assuring a continued flow of creative information by maintaining
that the Southern District Court of New York had prematurely decided the case on the
fair use issue to the prejudice of plaintiffs, the per curiam opinion of Circuit Court
Judges L. Hand, Augustus N. Hand and Patterson counseled the district courts:
We doubt the convenience of dividing the trial in this way: the issue of fair use,
which alone is decided, is the most troublesome in the whole law of copyright,
and ought not to be resolved in cases where it may turn out to be moot, unless
the advantage is very plain. At least we should regret seeing the procedure become
the custom, as it is apparently tending to become in the Southern District of New
York.
But cf. Rosenfield, The Constitutional Dimension of Fair Use in Copyright Law, 50
NOTRE DAME LAWYER 790, 804 (1975), where Mr. Rosenfield maintains that first
amendment constitutional considerations demand that fair use be something more than
an affirmative defense.
15. Sobel, Copyright and the First Amendment: A Gathering Storm? 19 ASCAP
COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. 43, 44 (1971).
16. In Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 22 (1970), the majority found a constitu-
tional mandate for a criminal suspect to have the opportunity to have counsel present
at a preliminary hearing. In his dissenting opinion, Chief Justice Burger characterizes
this discovery, made some two centuries after the writing of the Constitution, as "an
odd business."
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the incentives of publication and dissemination. This position is essen-
tially Goldstein's "second accommodative principle"1 7 which differs
from the "first accommodative principle" (identifying the accused in-
fringer with the short range public interest) in that "it identifies the
copyright owner with the long range public interest in the promotion of
expression.""'
Regardless of the final determination on the fair use issue in any
particular case, such an orderly presentation of the issues may find the
fair use issue narrowed to one less enigmatic than one of constitutional
conflict. The question of what constitutes "a copy," 1' 9 or "copies," is
one which is inextricably intertwined in the initial question of infringe-
ment in all cases yet calls to question the fairness of the use in but a
limited number of situations. That "copying" is an essential element of
plaintiff's prima facie case is undisputed.21 Further, it is generally recog-
nized that this burden is met by a showing that defendant had "access"
to the copyrighted work and that the allegedly infringing work is
"substantially similar" to the plaintiff's copyrighted work32 In cases of
reprographic infringement, proof of access poses little problem to plain-
tiff, if indeed the court is not willing to find the access conclusively
shown by the photocopy itself. One might also conclude that reprogra-
phy cases also render the element of substantial similarity moot, though
this would be to ignore the helpful distinction drawn by Professor Nim-
mer between "comprehensive nonliteral similarity" and "fragmented
literal similarity."
It is "fragmented literal similarity" which may form a defense
17. Goldstein, supra note 10, at 988.
18. Id. at 1015.
19. Copyright Act of 1909, 17 U.S.C. §1 (1976)(substantially revised by New Act,
supra note 2).
20. New Act, supra note 2, at §106. The use of the plural "copies" in the New
Act does not thereby sanction singular copying, but appears to be merely a grammatical
difference from the 1909 Act. Both the House and Senate Committee Reports contain
the same explanatory sentence: "The references to 'copies or phonorecords,' although
in the plural, are intended here and throughout the bill to include the singular." HOUSE
REPORT, supra note 5, at 61; SENATE REPORT, supra note 5, at 58.
21. 2 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §§8.01, 13.01, 13.03 (1978).
22. Sid & Marty Kroft Television Productions, Inc. v. McDonalds Corp., 562
F.2d 1157 (C.A. Cal. 1977); Musto v. Meyer, 434 F. Supp. 32 (D.C.N.Y. 1977); 3 M.
NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §13.01 [B], at 13-6 (1978).
23. 3 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §13.03 [A], at 13-16 (1978); see also
L. Hand's discussion of these concepts in Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d
119, 121-22 (2d Cir. 1930).
191 I1
5
et al.: Copyright, fair Use and Photocopying: AStone Conundrum
Published by NSUWorks, 1979
Nova Law Journal
prior to an initial finding of infringement in reprography cases.24 How
much literal borrowing of a copyrighted work is "substantial" within
the "substantial similarity" element of plaintiff's prima facie case?
Where reprography is the alleged infringement, an answer to this ques-
tion may prove as difficult of determination as convincing a court to
consider the question as part of the prima facie case. In United States
v. Taxe,2 a criminal prosecution under the Copyright Act of 1909, the
testimony of defendant Taxe conclusively showed that the complained
of infringement was the result of re-recording or pirating phonorecords
some of whiph were copyrighted post-1972. Although acknowledging
that substantial similarity must be found prior to a finding of infringe-
ment, the district court unreasonably deduced that any re-recording is
of necessity substantially similar to the initial recording and therefore
found that no substantial similarity need be shown where re-recording
is evident.26 Professor Nimmer points out that the question of substan-
tial similarity necessarily involves a consideration of defendant's use of
the copyrighted work (its importance to or the extent to which it forms
the kernel of the defendant's work), but also emphasizes that this
should not be confused with factors determinative of the separate issue
of "fair use." z It is helpful to an understanding of this puzzle to remain
aware that the substantial similarity issue goes to the initial question
of infringement: that is, has a protectible portion of plaintiff's work
been misappropriated? Has the protected work been "reproduced"
within 17 U.S.C. §106(1) or should the defendant's appropriation come
under the legal maxim of de minimis non curat lex? Any such finding
must, of course, be made after examining the extent of the alleged
infringement both quantitatively and qualitatively from the plaintiff's
24. United States v. Taxe, 380 F. Supp. 1010 (C.D. Cal. 1974) affd, 540 F.2d
961 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1040 (1977), although a case involving
infringement of phonorecords by re-recording, invites comparison to cases of alleged
photocopy infringement due to potential likeness of "fragmented literal similarity"
issues and facts.
25. Id.
26. This confusion of "access" with "substantial similarity" and thus of copying
with infringement did not, however, result in prejudice to defendants. As eloquently
expressed on appeal by Circuit Court Judge Goodwin:
We believe the instruction went beyond the law insofar as it purported to charac-
terize any and all re-recordings as infringements, but the subsequent inclusion of
a comparison test permitted the jury to consider "substantial similarity" and
cured any error in the earlier part of the instruction.
United States v. Taxe, 540 F.2d 961, 965 (9th Cir. 1976).
27. 3 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §13.03[A][21, at 13-28 (1978).
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perspective. That is, the analysis must be the amount of the work taken
and its significance not to defendant's work, but to the appropriated
work as a whole.2
The question of whether personal and private use of copyrighted
works is within the scope of the Copyright Act and thus subject to its
restrictions is one which has yet to be dealt with by the courts. However,
as early as 1960, Mr. Latman foresaw that "the increasing use of photo-
duplication processes will undoubtedly require continuing attention to
this area."'" This question is of course linked to the seeming conflict
betw'een the first amendment and the Copyright Clause, 0 and may be
avoided by application of the fair use doctrine. Given such an approach,
it is likely that any private use by photocopying, short of
"publication,"3 would be found "fair" by use of the now statutory
factors test. It is perhaps this likelihood which has led at least one
commentator to conclude that "anyone may copy copyrighted materials
for the purposes of private study and review."32 If this is a safe conclu-
sion, what then is the significance of the "single copying for teachers"
guidelines within the House Report?3
Does not the Conference Committee's acceptance of the House
version of section 107 (1) (which includes consideration of the non-profit
educational purpose of the use), when coupled with the restricted list of
permissible single copying for teachers imply that even single copying
by the lay public is at least an initial technical infringement? Further,
what of the specific statement in both House and Senate Reports that
references to "copies" are intended to include the singular?3'
In the past, fair use was said to be grounded, inter alia, in the
implied consent of the copyright proprietor. This theory seems much
28. Mathews Conveyor Co. v. Palmer Bee Co., 135 F.2d 73, 85 (6th Cir. 1943).
A comparison of the factors therein with those of the New Act, supra note 2, at §107,
may indicate just how settled the understanding of this distinction is.
29. A. LATMAN, FAIR USE OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS, STUDY No. 14 (1958)
prepared for the Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks and Copyrights, Senate Com-
mittee on the Judiciary, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (Comm. Print 1960).
30. See text accompanying notes 6 through 14 supra.
31. "'Publication' is the distribution of copies or phonorecords of a work to the
public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease or lending." New Act,
supra note 2, at §101.
32. Cohen, Fair Use in the Law of Copyright, 6 ASCAP COPYRIGHT L. SYMP.
43, 58 (1955).
33. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 5, at 68.
34. See notes 19 through 20 and accompanying text supra.
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less fictional when applied to the determination of what constitutes a
copy, more specifically whether the copying is so substantial as to be
"substantially similar." The implied consent fiction has largely been
replaced by factors which are presently determinative of the fairness of
the use. A further reason for abandonment of this basis for the doctrine
is that its logical extension may have led to the situation where, by
affixing copyright notice on every page, the proprietor could prevent any
quotation at all.35
On the other hand, there are publishers who are not adverse to
scholarly and educational copying of their copyrighted works and who
will consent to copying beyond that allowed by the 1976 Act and the
fair use doctrine. A draft report released in March 1978 by the National
Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works
(CONTU) 8 recommended several procedural steps and notice state-
ments which might clearly communicate such nonpossessory attitudes,
presumably without giving away what may effectively be the whole
copyright.37 There clearly should be no legal obstacle to such a practice
as long as the express grant of authority is equal to or extends that
already provided by the Copyright Act generally and the fair use doc-
trine specifically. Such a copyright holder should take care that the
wording of such notice is neither too broad nor too narrow. As an
example of a notice statement which is arguably too narrow, consider
the following, which was presented in memorandum form by the Asso-
ciation of American Law Schools [hereinafter referred to as AALS]:
Except as otherwise expressly provided, the author of each article in
this volume has granted permission for copies of that article to be made
for classroom use in a nationally accredited law school, provided that
1) copies are distributed at or below cost, 2) author and journal are iden-
tified and 3) proper notice of copyright is affixed to each copy.38
The legal effect of such a statement is, granted, merely an assurance that
if the conditions are complied with the user has a license to copy and
35. If the basis for fair use is implied consent, a statement by the author explicitly
removing any doubt as to his non-consent, such as ANY & ALL REPRODUCTION
IS PROHIBITED, would effectively destroy fair use and would soon frustrate constitu-
tional purposes behind the grant of a limited monopoly.
36. 371 PTCJ A-14 (March 23, 1978)(BNA).
37. Id. at A-19.
38. AALS Memorandum 78-25, Wayne McCormack, Associate Director, Asso-
ciation of American Law Schools, Washington D.C.
8
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need not rely upon section 107 fair use. However, when such a statement
is presented in conjunction with the legally mandated notice of copy-
right, does it not receive the imprimatur of legality thereby giving rise
to an inference that this is the extent of the rights/privileges provided
by law? Should such, albeit innocent, tampering with the public impres-
sion of legality be allowed when adherence to law is being frustrated by
the encouragement of indiscriminate photocopying? The recipients of
the same AALS memorandum were encouraged to include such a state-
ment in each issue of their law journals by the suggestion that feedback
as to the popularity of topics could be had for the asking merely by
including the added precondition to consent that notice be provided
prior to any copying.3 This goes too far."0 Regardless of one's position
as to the constitutional basis for the fair use doctrine, it is and should
remain a judicial rule of reason 1 unaffected either at law or in the
public's eye by unilateral statements of consent by the copyright holder.
It is perhaps illuminating that the "implied consent" fiction blos-
somed at a time when the state of the art was such that systematic
mechanical copying was simply not feasible for any but the few with
access to printing facilities. In later years, the mimeograph and other
stencil duplicators provided similar convenience to a wider population. 2
[Ilt is almost unanimously accepted that a scholar can make a handwrit-
ten copy of an entire copyrighted article for his own use, and in the era
39. Id.
40. A more sensible, and again arguably more valid, notice statement appears in
an earlier AALS memorandum:
Except as otherwise expressly provided the author of each article in this volume
has granted permission for copies of that article to be made and used by non-
profit educational institutions provided that author and journal are identified and
that proper notice of copyright is affixed to each copy.
AALS Memorandum 78-13. For a similar statement already in use by the American
Library Association, see material cited in note 37 supra. Compare the more concise
notice appearing in Professor Treece's recent article:
A license is hereby granted to students, teachers, librarians and journal publishers
to reproduce copies of this article by any means, and to distribute copies of this
article to the public, provided that copies reproduced for distribution to the public
include a notice of copyright in the following form: "Copyright @ 1977 by
James Treece."
Treece, Library Photocopying, 24 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1025 (1977).
41. HousE REPORT, supra note 5, at 65-68.
42. See I N. HENRY, COPYRIGHT-INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY-PUBLIC
POLICY, 28-31 (1975).
I
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before photoduplication it was not uncommon (and not seriously ques-
tioned) that he could have his secretary make a typed copy for his per-
sonal use and files.43
This statement was used by the narrow majority of the Court of Claims
in Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States" to further the proposition
that under the then governing 1909 Act, the word "copy" was not to be
given its ordinary meaning. Despite a rather strained argument by de-
fendant that the exclusive right to copy granted in section 1 of the 1909
Act should not apply to books and periodicals, the Court of Claims was
sufficiently c6nfused by the legislative history to abandon the basic tenet
of judicial construction that words be given their plain and literal mean-
ing.4" Chief Judge Cowen in his well reasoned dissent to the Williams
& Wilkins opinion found the meaning of "copy" apparent from the
wording of the 1909 Act and found it "not necessary to debate the
statutory history in light of the changes in the 1909 Act."
Although it is foreseeable that some photocopying cases may hinge
on the relatively narrow issue of "substantial similarity," it is probable,
at least in the foreseeable future, that the allegedly infringing photo-
copying will have been conducted on such a scale as to necessitate a
weighing of the statutory factors determinative of fair use. Any analysis
of the purpose and character of such wholesale photocopying would be
something less than intellectually honest if it were to view machine
copying as merely a substitute for hand copying and therefore fair use.,,
We live in a time when photocopies can be made in seconds and the
demand is apparently sufficient to warrant the placing of photocopiers
not only in most offices and libraries, but also in a growing number of
convenience stores. One dare not hypothesize, therefore, that hand cop-
ies would have been laboriously produced in any but an infinitesimal
proportion of the current photocopying explosion.
43. Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345, 1350 (Ct. Cl. 1973),
affd by an equally divided court, 420 U.S. 376 (1975).
44. 487 F.2d 1345.
45. 2A SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION §46.01. For a good discussion
of policies behind what has become known as "the plain meaning rule," see ENDLICH,
THE INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES, chapter 1 (1888).
46. 487 F.2d at 1365.
47. Id. at 1368.
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2. THE REPROGRAPHY EXPLOSION
In reprography cases, when weighing the decisive factors in an
effort to determine whether the use is fair, or whether "the value of the
original is sensibly diminished,"'8 one must bear in mind the cumulative
economic effect of the complained of photocopying. The temptation to
consider the copying in and of itself without any thought as to the
broader perspective and impact of such use upon the future market of
the copyright proprietor is strong. This is especially true where the use
itself is non-commercial and educational in nature. Such a myopic view
brushes under the carpet the effect of the reprography explosion on the
educational publishing industry.
That a reprography explosion exists is indisputable; only its size is
unknown. In 1962, the Fry Report, conducted for the National Science
Foundation, estimated that some 3.6 billion photocopies of both copy-
righted and uncopyrighted works were made annually." The president
of the Xerox Corporation reported in 1965 that roughly 9.5 billion
copies were produced in the United States in 1961.1 By 1967, this figure
had risen to 27.5 billion.5 1 The present annual total figure is unknown.
Also unknown is the number of photocopies made of copyrighted works.
It has, however, been estimated in a Dutch study that of the total
volume of photocopying about 5% contain copyrighted works. 2 This
percentage increases to 25% of all photocopying within educational in-
stitutions and to 65% of all library photocopying. 3 An American study
found that about 60% of library photocopying was of copyrighted
work." The same study found what is now generally recognized as true
in discussions of copyright and reprography: copies are made of periodi-
48. Folsom v. Marsh, 9 Fed. Cas. 342, 348, No. 4901 (C.C. Mass. 1841).
49. George Fry and Associates (1962) Survey ofCopyrightedMaterialReproduc-
tion Practices in Scientific and Technical Fields. Study prepared for the National
Science Foundation, appearing in 11 BULL. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y. 69 (1963).
50. I N. HENRY, supra note 42, at 59.
51. Kolle, Reprography and Copyright Law: A Comparative Law Study Con-
cerning the Role of Copyright Law in the Age of Information, 6 IIC 382, 385 (1975).
52. Id. But for exact figures, see Gerbrandy, The Netherlands Solution to the
Problem of Reprography, 1975 COPYRIGHT 47, 50.
53. Kolle, supra note 51, at 385.
54. Id. See also G. Sophar and L. Heilprin, The Determination of Legal Facts
and Economic Guideposts with Respect to the Dissemination of Scientific and Educa-
tional Information as It Is Affected by Copyright - A Status Report, Final Report:
Project No. 7-0793, Committee to Investigate Copyright Problems Affecting Communi-
cation in Science and Education, Inc. (1967).
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cals nine times as often as they are made from books, and of those
periodicals the most likely to be photocopied are scholarly, scientific
and technical journals.55
What effect does such wholesale photocopying have on the poten-
tial market for or value of these copyrighted "sci-tech" journals?58 And,
does this inquiry differ from the one answered by the Court of Claims
in Williams & Wilkins? It would seem that any attempted answer to
the first question must conclude that the potential market for "sci-tech"
journals is diminished by wholesale photocopying.57 The risks in the
"sci-tech" publishing industry are great," and the market small. The
business, when considered without subsidies, is therefore a marginal one
more critically affected by drops in already low subscription levels. 9
There is, however, as yet no empirically shown causal relationship be-
tween falling subscription levels and photocopying.
The question resolved against plaintiffs in Williams & Wilkins
called for a finding somewhat more certain than a mere tendency to
diminish the market. As Professor Nimmer charges, "The Court [Court
of Claims] fell into error by confusing the issues of damages and liabil-
ity." 0 One of three factors listed as the core of their evaluation of the
case was that "plaintiff has not . . . shown . . . that it is being or will
be harmed substantially by these specific practices of NIH and NLM."'
Must publishers of monographs now affirmatively show what publisher
Curtis Benjamin alleged in 1972, that because of photocopying "the
scientific and technical monographs will disappear by 1980T' ' 2
That this disappearance has not occurred is not evidence of mini-
mal impact of reprography on subsubscription levels, but perhaps is
55. Id. See also: I N. HENRY, supra note 42, at 62; Soaring Prices and Sinking
Sales of Science Monographs, 183 SCIENCE 282 (1974).
56. New Act, supra note 2, at §107(4).
57. Fried, Fair Use and the New Act, 22 N.Y.L. SCH. REv. 497, 507 (1977).
58. The Library of Congress has commented that one periodical dies each day
but three new ones are born. G. GIPE, NEARER TO THE DUST - COPYRIGHT AND THE
MACHINE 94 (1967).
59. I N. HENRY, supra note 42, at 61; PHYSICS TODAY reports that "[l1n the past
eight years the number of subscriptions to some physics journals has fallen by a factor
of two." PHYSICS TODAY, October 1977, at 104.
60. 3 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §13.05[E[41[cl, at 13-74 (1978).
61. Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F. 2d at 1354.
62. PUBLISHER'S WEEKLY, April 3, 1972, at 58. The necessity for such a showing
would seem contrary to the function of §504(c) of the New Act which provides for
statutory damages in the event such a showing is not feasible. See notes 143 through
145 and accompanying text infra.
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informative as to the chief source of revenue of the monograph. The four
monographs allegedly infringed in Williams & Wilkins are the excep-
tion in that they were commercial publications"3 and therefore pre-
sumably relied for the most part on advertising and subscriptions for
revenue. Advertising revenues are not as significant a form of income
for most non-profit journals due to limitations imposed by the Internal
Revenue Code on the tax-exempt income of qualifying non-profit organ-
izations." Non-profit monographs rely in the most part, and to varying
degrees, on subscription revenues and "page charges." The page charge
is a fixed rate per page charged to the author of a published article which
covers at least part of the cost of publication but is usually paid by the
institution supporting his research. 5 When underwritten by the federal
government, the page charge amounts to at least partial public subsidi-
zation of the journal. In 1961, the federal government, by far the largest
source of research funds, endorsed the page charge principle under the
rationale that research is not complete until its results are published.6
That government page charge revenues are substantial is evidenced by
the report that in 1970 the National Institute of Health paid out between
4 - 6 million dollars, or 1.5% of its total research awards, in page
charges.67 What portion of the publishing costs of non-profit mono-
graphs are met by page charges and to what extent they are reliant on
subscription revenue is not known. 6 The question is nonetheless posed:
should an organization largely supported by public monies be permitted
63. A 1962 survey of 262 representatives [sic] scientific journals conducted by
the National Science Foundation revealed that 211 were published by non-profit scien-
tific societies, 18 by university presses and 33 by commercial publishing firms." I N.
HENRY, supra note 42, at 66.
64. I.R.C. §§501(b), 501(c)(3), 511(a), 512(b), 513(c). Most non-profit publishers
would likely qualify for tax-exempt status under §501(c)(3). §513(c) specifically includes
advertising as an unrelated business activity of any such tax-exempt organization. Ad-
vertising revenues are therefore taxable as unrelated business income. The tax is, how-
ever, computed with the modifications provided in §512(b), many of which are excluded
as deductions "directly connected" with the income.
65. 3 SCHOLARLY PUBLISHING 62, 62-69 (October, 1971).
66. Id. at 64.
67. Id. at 67.
68. The Editor-in-Chief of the Americal Physical Society publications, THE
PHYSICAL REVIEw and Physical Review Letter, is reported as having said in 1968 that
about 70% of the cost of publishing comes from page charges and 30% from subscrip-
tions. Id. at 63; see also Sophar and Heilprin, supra note 54, which indicates a somewhat
smaller figure in that non-profit journals surveyed reported that 41% of their incomes
were derived from subscriptions.
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to limit public access to their publication by asserting copyright? Any
question of the copyrightability of such publication should be dealt with
legislatively. For judicial attempts to account for such an equitable
argument would almost certainly skew consideration of the time tested
and now statutorily imposed fair use factors and would serve to lessen
their usefulness when applied in more classic fair use situations. 9 In
short, the fair use doctrine must be applied as it appears at 17 U.S.C.
§107 which specifies that the inquiry to be made should be: "the effect
on the potential market" and not whether plaintiff has successfully
shown substantial harm as in Williams & Wilkins.70 This "probable
effects test"" based as it is on logic rather than on concrete evidence72
has been used successfully in the past73 to assure the economic incentive
of copyright and will hopefully survive Williams & Wilkins.
3. PHOTOCOPYING: THE STATUTE AND THE LEGISLA-
TIVE HISTORY
If there was ever any but the most philosophical doubt that the fair
use doctrine extended to photocopying, it could not stand in the face of
the language in section 107. 71 The House Report makes this clear.
"[T]he reference to fair use 'by reproduction in copies or phonorecords
or by any other means' is mainly intended to make clear that the doc-
trine has as much application to photocopying and copying as to older
forms of use."75 This appears as one of the more bold statements of
69. See notes 13 and 14 And accompanying text supra.
70. 487 F. 2d at 1354; see also Marvin Worth Productions v. Superior Films
Corp., 319 F. Supp. 1269, 1274 (S.D. N.Y. 1970) where, after finding defendant's film
on the life of Lenny Bruce infringing, the district court per Lasker, J. said, "[lit seems
as certain as it can be, except after the fact, that the distribution and public showing of
Dirtymouth [defendant's film] will operate to reduce the demand for Worth's [plaintiff]
film." (emphasis added).
71. Fried, supra note 57, at 505.
72. Id.
73. The probable effects test was applied in granting preliminary injunctions in:
Inge v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 143 F. Supp. 294, 302 (S.D. N.Y. 1956);
Marvin Worth Productions v. Superior Films Corp., 319 F. Supp. 1269, 1276 (S.D.
N.Y. 1970); Henry Holt & Co. v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 23 F. Supp. 302, 304
(E.D. Pa. 1938); Addison-Wesley Publishing Co. v. Brown, 223 F. Supp. 219 (E.D. N.Y
1963).
74. "[Flair use . . . including such use by reproduction in copies ...... New
Act, supra note 2, at §107.
75. HousE REPORT, supra note 5, at 66.
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congressional intent behind section 107. The desire not to "freeze" the
fair use doctrine accounts both for the circumspect statement of intent
as to section 107 and for the absence of a specific education section in
the new Act.7" Even though choosing to specifically include photocopy-
ing within the scope of fair use, Congress had provided guidance as to
the permissible scope of photocopying only in the areas of teacher use,
classroom and library reproduction. As the statistics would indicate,77
these are the areas most ripe for confrontation between the holders and
users and are most deserving of specific legislative consideration.
A. Guidelines for Educational Photocopying
It should initially be made clear that the specific guidelines for
educational reproduction, appearing in the House Report as an agree-
ment between negotiating representatives of authors, publishers and
educational institutions7 s [hereinafter "guidelines"], are twice removed
from actual law. The presentation of the guidelines in agreement form7
rather than as a formally adopted statement of the intention of the
House of Representatives casts a peculiar light on their legal signifi-
cance. Both the House Judiciary Committee and the guidelines them-
selves caution that the negotiated agreement is not intended in any way
to interfere with the judicial application of the fair use doctrine.,, Since
this warning could most certainly be found to apply to those situations
specifically anticipated by the guidelines, an opening is thereby created
for judicial modification, hopefully without destroying the certainty and
protection they were intended to provide. Another perspective on the
relationship and impact of the guidelines on fair use is offered by the
76. "[T]here is no disposition to freeze the doctrine in the statute, especially
during a period of rapid technological change." Arguments on the subject of a specific
educational section, presented in the 1967 House Judiciary Committee Report, are
unofficially incorporated by reference in the HousE REPORT. After rejecting an educa-
tion section, the Committee wrote, "The fullest possible use of the multitude of technical
devices now available to education should be encouraged." H.R. REP. No. 83, 90th
Cong., I st Sess. 31 (1967). For an example of an educational section, see 46 F. L. REv.
91, 129 (1977).
77. See notes 49 through 55 and accompanying text supra.
78. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 5, at 67-70; parts of the following discussion apply
equally to the similar agreement reached by representatives of music teachers, schools
and publishers, appearing in the HoUSE REPORT, supra note 5, at 70-71.
79. Id. at 67.
80. Id. at 68, 70.
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Conference Committee who "accept [the guidelines] as part of their
understanding of fair use."'"
The practical significance of the agreement is more clear.
"Teachers kill [sic] know that copying within the guidelines is fair use.
Thus, the guidelines serve the purpose of fulfilling the need for greater
certainty and protection for teachers.""2 Although teachers may fairly
assume that any copying within the guidelines is allowed as fair use, at
what point beyond the guidelines should a teacher feel that he or she
may be infringing and choose to either surreptitiously proceed with or
abandon the proposed photocopying? This undoubtedly is the question
being asked by teachers. The authors and publishers are perhaps happy
with a compromise agreement which raises the question so acutely3 in
the minds of educators who, as late as 1975, were somewhat less likely
to consider the rights of the copyright proprietor before photocopying.
Educators, on the other hand, may appreciate the fact that the agree-
ment provides for the first time some "minimum standards" for educa-
tional fair use."
By distinguishing single copying for teachers from multiple copies
for classroom use, the guidelines acknowledge important differences in
the purpose and character of the respective uses. A single copy may be
made by or for a teacher at his or her request for the purposes of
scholarly research, use in teaching or preparation to teach a class.,
Under the guidelines, these rights extend only to a specified list of
materials.86
Multiple copies may be made for classroom use provided that tests
of brevity and spontaneity are met, the cumulative effect considerations
are complied with and each copy includes a notice of copyright. The
brevity test(s) are specific and vary with the nature of the copyrighted
work be it prose, poetry, illustration or "special" work. 7 "Spontaneity"
81. CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 5, at 70.
82. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 5, at 72.
83. New Copyright Law: What's It To You? 67 ENGLISH JOURNAL 16, 17 (Febru-
ary, 1978); Stedman, New Copyright Law: Photocopying for Educational Use. 63
AAUP BULL. 5 (February, 1977).
84. Although most references to the "minimum standard" language found by this
researcher seem to assume benefit to educators, one definition of the word, "standard,"
i.e., a requirement of moral conduct, suggests the possibility at least that the phrase is
double-edged. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2223 (1971).
85. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 5, at 68.
86. See notes 31 through 34 and accompanying text supra.
87. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 5, at 68-69.
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requires both that the inspiration to copy be that of the individual
teacher (as opposed to a directive from administration) and that the
time between the inspiration to make copies and the moment of their
use is such that it would be unreasonable to expect a timely reply to a
request for permission." This time element of the spontaneity test.pre-
cludes photocopying the same material for classroom use term after
term.8 The cumulative effects test limits the number of works which
may be copied from the same author, collective work or periodical
volume during one class term. The instances of such multiple copying
are limited to nine for the term of each course within the school where
the copies are made. 0
The specific prohibitions within the agreement apply both to single
copying for teachers and multiple copying for classroom use. "Copying
shall not be used to create or to replace or substitute for anthologies,
compilations or collective works."'" There should be no copying from
"consumable" works such as tests, answer sheets, workbooks and like
material. General prohibitions against copying which: (1) substitutes for
purchase; (2) is directed by a higher authority; (3) is repeated from term
to term; or (4) is charged to the student beyond cost, 2 similarly apply
to both single and multiple copying.
B. Section 108: Library Photocopying
By including section 108 in the 1976 Act, Congress provided librar-
ies with limited statutory protection against infringement actions in
addition to that provided by section 107 fair use.' A library having no
privilege specifically granted by section 108 may find a defense within
the scope of section 107 fair use. More specifically, although section 108
details the conditions under which libraries may reproduce and distrib-
ute copies, it should be remembered that where the library is copying
88. Id.
89. This practice is further specifically prohibited by the guidelines. Id. at 69.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 70.
93. New Act, supra note 2, at §108(0(4). "Nothing in section 108 impairs the
applicability of the fair use doctrine to a wide variety of situations involving photocopy-
ing or other reproduction by a library of copyrighted material in its collections, where
the user requests the reproduction for legitimate scholarly or research purposes."
HOUSE REPORT, supra note 5, at 78-79.
13:1979
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for a teacher, it, as agent, may depend on the teacher's fair use privi-
lege.94
The section 108 privileges "to reproduce and distribute . . .no
more than one copy of a work,"" are initially subject to three general
conditions. The first being that "[t]he reproduction or distribution is
made without any purpose of direct or indirect commercial advan-
tage."9 Problems of defining "direct or indirect commercial advantage"
are allayed by the House Report which reads: "[TIhe advantage referred
to in this clause must attach to the immediate commercial motivation
behind the reproduction or distribution itself, rather than to the ultimate
profit-making motivation behind the enterprise in which the library is
located."97 This would allow "corporate libraries" in such places as
clinics, law firms and research and development corporations to single
copy and distribute to their employees, provided there is compliance
with the other general and specific conditions of section 108.11
The Congress evidently had such "corporate libraries" in mind
when drafting the second general condition, that "the collections of the
library or archives are (i) open to the public, or (ii) available not only
to researchers affiliated with the library or archives or with the institu-
tion of which it is a part, but also to other persons doing research in a
specialized field."99 The quid pro quo for the privileges given these
"subsection (a) libraries"' ® is the making of their collections "open"
and "available," thereby furthering the policy of greater public access
and broader dissemination of information. But what of libraries such as
those of some private colleges and universities which are freely accessi-
ble to the university population, but are open to the general public only
upon payment of a license fee? The plain meaning of the word "public"
would indicate that such libraries should more likely be characterized
as "private" and hence not granted section 108 privileges. However,
the argument may be made that by the use of "open to the public,"
Congress intended section 108 privileges to extend to a broader category
94. Treece, supra note 40, at 1039.
95. These are more clearly words of limitation which, when applied to use by an
entity capable of wide distribution (such as a library), do not seem to raise the same
inference as to technical infringement of "single copying" as does single copying by
teachers discussed in the text accompanying note 33 supra.
96. New Act, supra note 2, at §108(a)(l).
97. House REPORT, supra note 5, at 75.
98. CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 5, at 74.
99. New Act, supra note 2, at §108(a)(2).
100. Treece, supra note 40, at 1033.
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than would have been included by use of the more common phrase
"public libraries."'' 1 Assuming that such private libraries are not within
subsection (a) some may find the protection provided by section 108(d)
sufficient incentive to open their collections to the general public.
The third general condition or prerequisite to the privileges granted
by section 108 is that "the reproduction or distribution of the work
includes a notice of copyright."'02 It is not specified whether this notice
must be according to form required by the notice provision of the new
Act'03 or whether a notice in the form of a warning would suffice. For
example: WARNING: THIS WORK MAY BE SUBJECT TO THE
PROTECTION OF FEDERAL COPYRIGHT LAWS 17 U.S.C. §§
101-810. While not of paramount legal significance, this difference
could have great impact on library photocopying of material which does
not display section 40 1(b)'0' copyright notice on each page. For while it
would be a simple matter to include the above warning/notice as a flap
fixed to the copier which could appear along the margin of each photo-
copy, considerable employee time would be spent locating and properly
affixing the individualized section 401(b) notice to all copies made from
protected works.
In examining the conditions which accompany the various specific
privileges within section 108, one must remember that the general condi-
tions of section 108(a) discussed above are criteria which must be satis-
fied prior to qualification for any of the specific privileges provided by
section 108.
Subsection (b) extends the rights of reproduction and distribution
of one copy of an unpublished work for the purposes of preservation,
security or deposit in another subsection (a) library if a copy of the
unpublished work is currently in the collection of the copying library.0 5
Subsection (c) allows reproduction of a published work solely for the
purpose of replacement of a copy that is damaged, deteriorating, lost
or stolen if, after a reasonable investigation, an unused replacement
cannot be found at a fair price.' °0 Both the Senate and House Reports
101. An otherwise private college library may, by involvement in interlibrary loan
programs, make its collection "available" to the public and thus arguably qualify as a
subsection (a) library. 46 F. L. REV. 91, 107 (1977).
102. New Act, supra note 2, at §108(a)(3).
103. Id. §401(b).
104. Id.
105. Id. §108(b).
106. Id. §108(c).
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provide guidance as to what constitutes a reasonable investigation, 0 but
acknowledge that the scope of a reasonable investigation will vary ac-
cording to the circumstances of a particular situation.'" Both subsec-
tions (b) and (c) limit reproduction to facsimile form. "Thus a library
may reproduce from its own microform holdings a microform user copy
. . ,"0 However, transfer from an original form (such as printed
matter) to a microduplication or computerized system is not within the
privileges granted by subsection (b) or (c).
Subsection (d) grants rights of reproduction and distribution of
single copies of a small part of any copyrighted work"0 to both individ-
ual libraries and those participating in interlibrary loan arrangements."'
Conditions imposed are: (1) that the copy become the property of the
user; (2) that the library have no notice that the copy is to be used for
any purpose other than private study, scholarship, or research; and, (3)
that the library display the warning of copyright issued by the Register
of Copyrights."' That the second "no notice" condition does not require
the library to affirmatively seek out information as to the status and
identity of the user"3 is significant in light of what appears to be a
growing trend amongst other western countries to impose such a duty
of inquiry even in situations of in-house copying performed by, instead
of for, the user."4
Subsection (e) grants rights of reproduction and distribution of
single copies of whole, or substantial parts of copyrighted works both
107. "It will always require recourse to commonly-known trade sources in the
United States, and in the normal situation also to the publisher or other copyright owner
(if such owner can be located at the address listed in the copyright registration), or an
authorized reproducing service." HousE REPORT, supra note 5, at 76; SENATE REPORT,
supra note 5, at 68.
108. HousE REPORT, supra note 5, at 75; SENATE REPORT, supra note 5, at 68.
109. Treece, supra note 40, at 1050.
110. "Any copyrighted work" specifically includes articles or other contributions
to collective works or periodical issues, but does not extend to those works specifically
excluded from §108 by §108(h). See generally New Act, supra note 2, at §108(d), (h).
11l. New Act, supra note 2, at §108(d).
112. 42 Fed. Reg. 59,264 (1977) (to be codified in 37 C.F.R. 201.14).
113. Treece, supra note 40, at 1050.
114. Soci&t6 Masson v. CNRS, [1974] D.S. JUR. 337 (Trib. gr. inst. 1974) where
defendant, state-operated Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, was held liable
for infringement because of its failure to practice suitable supervisory measures, such
as requiring proof of user's identity and purpose, prior to allowing copies to be made
on its machines. Cf University of New South Wales v. Moorhouse et al., 6 AUSTL. L.
R. 193 (High Ct. 1975).
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to individual libraries and those participating in interlibrary loan ar-
rangements. 1 5 In addition to the conditions imposed by subsection (d),11
a reasonable investigation" 7 must be undertaken to find a copy at a fair
price.
Subsection (f)(1) makes it clear that libraries are not liable under
section 108 for any infringement resulting from unsupervised use of
copiers located on library premises."8 The copier must, however, display
a notice that the making of a copy may be subject to the copyright
law."' Subsection (0(2) places the liability for any infringement in such
a situation with the user.' Subsection (0(4) asserts that a fair use
defense is unaffected by section 108. It further provides that contractual
obligations assumed at the time that the copy was obtained shall domi-
nate the privileges granted by Section 108.
C. Section 108(g)
Congress has responded to the call for legislative guidance made
by the Court of Claims in the Williams & Wilkins case by the enactment
of subsection (g).111 Generally, subsection (g) attempts to establish limits
on both in-house and interlibrary loan photocopying. Subsection (g)(1)
warns that the rights of section 108 do not extend to cases where the
library has actual or substantial reason to believe that it is involved in
related or concerted reproduction or distribution of multiple copies of
the same material, whether made at one time or over a period of time.
Furthermore, it is- irrelevant whether such copying is for aggregate use
by one or more individuals or for individual use of members of a
group.'2
Addressing itself to the specific question of interlibrary loan photo-
copying, subsection (g)(2)
prohibits systematic photocopying of copyrighted materials but permits
interlibrary arrangements "that do not have, as their purpose or effect,
115. New Act, supra note 2, at §108(e).
116. See note I I I and accompanying text supra.
117. See note 107 and accompanying text supra.
118. New Act, supra note 2, at §108(0(1). See note 114 supra.
119. New Act, supra note 2, at §108(0(1).
120. Id. §108(0(2).
121. Id. §108(g).
122. Id. §108(g)(1). For an example of such prohibited conduct, see SENATE RE-
PORT, supra note 5, at 70 [Example 2].
1 3:1979
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that the library or archives receiving such copies or phonorecords for
distribution does so in such aggregate quantities as to substitute for a
subscription to or purchase of such work."'"
To paraphrase: purposeful or effective systematic copying is prohibited,
but only in such "aggregate quantities"124 as to "substitute for a sub-
scription . . . or purchase."''2
Some guidance as to the meaning of the key phrases "aggregate
quantities" and "substitute for a subscription . . . or purchase" is pro-
vided by the CONTU guidelines12 1 on which there has been substantial
agreement by the principal library, publisher and author organiza-
tions.127 With respect to periodicals, the guidelines apply only to issues,
or articles therein, published within five years prior to the date of the
request for the copy. Requests filled for six or more articles from any
given periodical title28 within a year shall be considered such an aggre-
gate quantity as to substitue for a subscription or purchase and thus a
use not protected by section 108.129 Limited protection for the subscrip-
tion levels of scientific and technical journals has thus been provided.13'
The absence of guidelines as to quantities which will substitute for sub-
scription or purchase of periodicals or articles published more than five
years prior to the date of request indicates that libraries shall be given
somewhat greater latitude in copying these materials. This is perhaps
because of the minimal effect of the use upon the market and value of
the copyrighted work.'
Works other than periodical articles which are also within the pur-
view of subsection (d)32 are similarly protected against copying which
may substitute for purchase. The guidelines provide that filled requests
of six or more copies of or from such a work within a year may be
123. CONTU Guidelines for Inter-Library Arrangements. Circular R-
21-Reproduction of Copyrighted Works by Educators and Librarians, a Copyright
Office Publication 7 (November 7, 1977).
124. New Act, supra note 2, at §108(g)(2).
125. Id.
126. CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 5, at 72-74.
127. Id. at 72.
128. The actual language of the guideline reads "periodical (as opposed to any
given issue of a periodical) .... " Id.
129. Id.
130. See generally notes 48 through 73 and accompanying text supra.
131. See New Act, supra note 2, at §107(4).
132. Works such as fiction, poetry and collective works are contemplated by the
CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 5, at 73.
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considered to substitute for purchase. 33 Further, these works are pro-
tected equally, and without prejudice as to the date of publication,
throughout the copyright term. 34
Subscription and purchase are further encouraged in the guidelines.
If the requesting entity has within its collection, or has ordered a copy
of the copyrighted work, the copying shall be treated as if performed
within its own library. 13 Similar protection is provided to requests for
copies of periodicals a subscription to which has been ordered. This
policy offers the dual reward of both increasing public access and en-
couraging subscription. After placing five interlibrary loan requests
from the same periodical within a year, a library could recognize its
need for an added subscription, subscribe, and provide an interlibrary
loan copy of the requested article without delay to the user or prejudice
to its quota.
In the interest of enforcement, the guidelines provide two further
substantive recommendations: first, that each request for a copy should
be accompanied by a representation that the request is being made in
conformity with the guidelines, and second, that the requesting entity
should keep a record of all requests for copies covered by the guidelines
and that records be maintained until the end of the third calendar year
after the end of the calendar year of any particular request.'
The caution with which both Congress and CONTU approached
section 108 is evidenced by subsections within both section 10813 and
the guidelines' calling for a re-examination of this section of the Act
five years from the effective date. Reports to be solicited from authors,
publishers and libraries will hopefully shed light on the extent to which
section 108 has proven effective in balancing the rights of creators with
the needs of users.13 9
Although this recognition of the need for review of the library
photocopying provisions may detract from the efficacy of section 108,
placing the burden for final resolution of issues therein on the concerned
parties may prove to facilitate agreement.1 0 Barbara Ringer suggests
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. New Act, supra note 2, at §108(i).
138. CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 5, at 73.
139. New Act, supra note 2, at §108(i).
140. Ringer, The Unfinished Business of Copyright Revision, 24 U.C.L.A. L.
REV. 951, 967-68 (1977).
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that this burden for final resolution of the "unfinished business" of
section 108 may encourage libraries to make a good faith effort to
comply with both section 108 and the CONTU guidelines, thereby pro-
moting a greater "spirit of comity"'' in future negotiations. In light of
prospective developments in information storage and retrieval sys-
tems,4 2 no legislation attempting to proscribe practices in this area is
likely to be of long lasting significance. Section 108 shall then hopefully
prove to meet its intended purpose of complementing, at least in the
interim, the fair use doctrine.
A final mention should be made of the section 504111 damages
provision as it applies in cases of innocent photocopying of protected
works by employees or agents of educational institutions and libraries.
Section 504(c)(2) mandates that statutory damages shall be remitted so
as to protect a specified class of defendant. This does not, of course,
preclude a plaintiff from obtaining a judgment in the amount of dam-
ages actually suffered (which may or may not be found to include lost
profits).
The class protected by the section 504 remission of statutory dam-
ages includes not only the employees or agents of non-profit schools and
libraries, if acting within the scope of their employment, but also the
institutions themselves.
Any member of the protected class must have "believed and had
reasonable grounds for believing that his or her use of the copyrighted
work was a fair use under section 107."' This language seems to aim
at situations in which an infringing use has been made of a work which
has for some reason appeared without notice of copyright. However,
section 405 of the new Act' (permitting as it does new latitude as to
omission of notice and copyright validity) specifically removes liability
for such innocent infringement not only for statutory damages but also
for actual damages. Does then this language of section 504(c)(2) have
an exclusive function or does this subsection generally attempt to insure
that statutory damages shall be awarded in an equitable fashion?
Due to the lack of any mention in section 504(c)(2) of section 108,
an analysis of this question may expose some painful questions as to the
interrelationship of sections 107 and 108.
141. Id.
142. Treece, supra note 40, at 1058-66; I N. HENRY, supra note 42, at 33.
143. New Act, supra note 2, at §504.
144. Id. §504(c)(2).
145. Id. §405.
1 210
Nova Law Journal 3:1979 1
24
Nova Law Review, Vol. 3, Iss. 1 [1979], Art. 11
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol3/iss1/11
3: 199CprgtadFi|s 1
4. CONCLUSION
The problems arising from consideration of the fair use doctrine as
applied to the photocopying of copyrighted works are intricate and
difficult of solution. The changing state of technology, in both the areas
of photoduplication and information storage and retrieval systems, con-
tributes to the already complex problems by casting doubt on the dura-
bility of any potential solutions.
What will be the impact of already budding technological attempts
to prevent photocopying? 4 6
Will the dissemination of reprography related technology force the
courts to more thoroughly address the origins and basis for the fair use
doctrine? For, as Justice Cardozo has said, "Rivulets in combination
make up a stream of tendency that may attain engulfing power."' 47
Present attempts at dealing with reprography's growing "stream of
tendency" are modeled to varying degrees after performing rights socie-
ties such as the American Society of Composers, Authors and Publish-
ers (ASCAP).48 The future of this area of the law depends in no small
measure on the success of these clearinghouse systems.
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